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ELECTORAL PROCESS IN BOTSWANA: A SYNOPSIS
Oagile Key Dingake
Lecturer in Law, University of Botswana
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to provid^ an overview of Botswana's electoral process. It 
outlines the functional demands of elections, identifies the contentious issues in the electoral 
process, and where appropriate, suggests the way forward. Botswana's electoral system 
has yielded unsatisfactory results which have tended to distort the support of political 
parties on the ground.’ To this extent, the article discusses, albeit briefly, the political 
consequences of the first past the post electoral systems and other electoral systems. 
Botswana is a multi-party state with nine duly registered parties.1 2
The two leading political parties are the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the Botswana 
National Front. The administration of elections is the responsibility of the Independent 
Electoral Commission.3
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Botswana gained its independence from Britain in 1966 and inherited a liberal democratic 
system of government. The constitution that was adopted mandated the holding of elections 
once every five years. Since then (1965) the country has held seven (7) local and 
parliamentary elections.4
In March 1965 Botswana held its first elections which led to self-rule and full independence. 
The 1965 general elections were administered by the colonial administration. The first four 
elections after the 1965 elections have been administered by the Botswana Civil Service 
under the Permanent Secretary to the Office of the President, as supervisor of elections.5 
After a series of complaints that the Permanent Secretary is not an impartial figure to 
administer elections, the government in 1988 responded by removing the office of the 
supervisor of elections from the Office of the President into an "independent office". This 
move did not succeed to allay fears of partiality as opposition parties continued to call for 
an independent electoral commission.
Botswana is a multi-party state which has never postponed elections which were 
constitutionally due. This track record of absolute fidelity to elections is unparalleled in 
Africa. A caveat need to be added, however, that the holding of elections does not
1. Botswana follows the first past the post electoral system which it inherited from Britain in 1966.
2. Report to the Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration on the General Election 
(1994).
3. S. 67 of the Constitution of Botswana, as amended in 1997.
4. The 1994 elections were the seventh since 1965.
5. Bojosi et al (eds), "Consolidating Democracy; The Electoral Process Under Scrutiny" (Report of the 
Workshop on Electoral Law and Administration of Elections of Botswana Held on 19-2U February, 
1993, Chapter 5.
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automatically mean a country is democratic.6 Elections are but, a significant ingredient of 
a democratic order.
FUNCTIONAL DEMANDS OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
Elections are an essential aspect of a democratic dispensation. The primary purpose of 
elections are to allow people to select or choose a government of their choice. It therefore 
follows that the wishes of the people as expressed through the ballot should be respected. 
As it is often said — there is no point in consulting them if no notice is to be taken of their 
answer.
The above purpose, which one may call the fundamental purpose of elections is crisply 
captured in article 21 (3), of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides:
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall 
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by a secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Although conventional wisdom has it that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
not binding, it being a declaration, the tide and heightened commitment to democracy 
leads one to a submission, that free and fair elections held at regular intervals is now a 
binding rule of international law. Voting rights lie at the root of parliamentary democracy. 
Indeed, many regard them as a basic human right. Nevertheless, they are not like the air 
we breath. They do not just happen. They have to be conferred, or at least defined and the 
categories of citizen, who enjoy them have also to be defined.7 8
However fair and regular the election may be, their political consequences are governed 
on the main by the electoral system that is operative. Electoral systems determine the way 
in which votes are cast and ultimately how seats are allocated, while the electoral law 
deals with the procedure of conducting elections/
An electoral system has to fulfil the following needs: create a legislature that is 
representative, accountable and should not emasculate the effectiveness of the ruling party 
to govern.9 Constitutional engineers have also been concerned with ensuring that in any 
electoral system that is chosen there should be a link between the voters and their elected 
representative so as to avoid representatives representing only their views and thereby 
undermining democracy.
Democratic elections must meet certain basic requirements, which are:
(i) All adults regardless of race or religion, should enjoy the right to vote.
(ii) The ballot should be cast freely and secretly.
(iii) Elections should be held regularly within prescribed time-limits.
(iv) All sections of the community should be free to put forward candidates, to form 
political parties and campaign openly.
6. Ibid., Chapter 2-6.
7. Per John Donaldson UR in Fiippersnn v Newsburg Electoral Registration Officer 1985 Q.B. 1060. 1067.
8. Kader Asmal et al "An Electoral System for South Africa". In Free and Fair Elections (1994), pp. 1-23.
9. Ibid.
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(v) Campaign period should be of sufficient length.
(vi) An honest, competent, non-partisan administrative body with an impartial body being 
able to adjudicate over election disputes.
(vii) All parties should accept the results and facilitate smooth transfer of power.
The above constitutes the minimum requirements of free and fair elections. Over time 
democratic governments have changed or adapted their electoral systems and/or laws to 
meet the above criteria.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONTENTIOUS ISSUES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
Botswana's opposition parties have consistently complained of exclusion in the running 
of elections.1" Complaints have been made consistently that election administration is not 
impartial and transparent. Lack of transparency has led to charges by some political parties 
of election rigging. Growing discontent with the electoral process has in the past led 
opposition parties to consider boycotting the elections. There have been election petitions 
complaining of undue election of certain candidates in virtually every election by the ruling 
party or the opposition parties. Some of the these petitions have been successful.10 1
The state media has also been accused of lack of impartiality in its coverage of election 
campaigns.12 The state media is composed of the daily newspaper and the radio. Radio 
Botswana reaches a majority of people, more than any other media in Botswana and 
consequently has a significant bearing on election campaigns and results. There is to date 
no law that regulates equitable coverage of political parties campaigns. Equitable coverage 
of all parties is one of the essential ingredients of fair and democratic elections. A vibrant, 
vigilant press committed to equitable coverage lies at the root of democracy, for without a 
free press committed to the equitable coverage of political players, public education that 
brings about informed choice will not be possible.
The above concerns demonstrate that Botswana's electoral process is not beyond reproach 
and its credibility is at best suspect. It is not possible to dismiss these concerns as frivolous 
and vexatious. A catalogue of these concerns alone justifies a rigorous academic study, so 
that if all or some of these concerns are found to be true, remedial measures may be taken. 
Indeed, an electoral process must not only be fair and democratic, but must be seen to be 
so.
Although the impartiality of the delimitation commission has not been seriously and 
consistently taken up as an issue, concerns have been expressed in the past by academics 
and other sections of civil society that there is quite often malapportionment of electoral 
districts (constituencies). In 1981 the disparity in wards in terms of registered voters varied 
from as high as 17 to 1 in Lobatse and 12 to 1 in Ghanzi to a low 2.5 to 1 in Gaborone.13 The 
establishment of electoral boundaries is a critical part of the electoral process because it
10. Bojosi (note 5) Chapter 5.
11. Ibid., Chapter 3.
12. Bojosi (note 5) Chapter 5.
13. John Holm, "Elections and Democracy in Botswana". In Democracy in Botswana (1989), p. 191.
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has a direct bearing on the results of the elections. It is important that the law should 
provide for a fair, transparent and all inclusive procedure of delimiting electoral boundaries. 
Malapportionment or gerrymandering as it is called in electoral discourse, also leads to 
inequality of voters. In a situation where a constituency is twice as big as another, for 
instance, it effectively means that a voter of the bigger constituency has less influence in 
selecting a candidate than another voter in a smaller constituency.14
Some of Botswana's electoral laws are unnecessarily inhibitive to candidates, voters, political 
parties and ultimately undermine democracy. The electoral laws place age, residence and 
financial limitations on voters, candidates and political parties respectively. Currently 
voting age is 18 years.15 16Candidates are required to pay some deposits. Batswana outside 
the country will vote for the first time in the 1999 elections.15 Political parties are not 
subsidised. After elections the law empowers parliament and in some cases a minister to 
appoint MPs and Counsellors respectively. Complaints have been raised in the past that 
the system of special nominations is undemocratic especially when it is used to reward 
party members and to overturn victory of another party, as has happened on several 
occasions in Botswana.
There is no law that governs a situation where chosen representatives defect from their 
political parties to join other political parties before the expiry of their terms of office. The 
current position is that elected representatives can defect to other parties and maintain 
their seats, notwithstanding that they were elected on a different party ticket.17 189The role of 
the police during elections is not clearly defined and concerns have been expressed that in 
some rural constituencies their presence may be intimidatory.
The judiciary has often adopted a rather rigid approach in dealing with disputes.1S It has 
tended to give undue weight to technicalities rather than the merits of the petitions. It is 
important to find a more flexible way of dealing with electoral disputes that take into 
consideration the particular circumstances of Botswana and the need to ensure that 
acquisition of power is legitimate. Undue concern with delays in bringing petitions instead 
of the merits of the case may not be in the interests of democracy.
The requirement of security as a condition sine qua non for filing an election petition which 
is mandatory in terms of the Electoral Act is also an area of concern which makes the court 
inaccessible to election petitioners. Botswana's first past the post electoral system has been 
in operation since 1966 to date. Since then Botswana's elections have not led to a change of 
government. For 30 years only one political party has dominated Botswana's politics, 
winning most elections with a landslide majority. This trend made Botswana effectively a 
de facto one-party state.14 The highest number of seats won by the combined opposition 
before the 1994 elections is five (5) in a thirty-two member parliament. An interesting trend 
however, of the elections was that the opposition popular vote has steadily increased over
14. Ibid., pp. 191-4.
15 . Reduction of voting age from 21 years to 18 was only done in 1997.
16. See the Constitution Amendment Act, 1997.
17. John Holm (note 13) p. 198.
18. Bojosi (note) Chapter 5.
19. Patrick Molutsi, "Botswana's Democratic Institutions: Strength and Weakness", In Democracy in the 
21st Century, p. 28.
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the years while that of the ruling party plummeted steadily. This trend was however, not 
reflected in the number of seats gained by opposition parties.
Botswana's electoral system has been criticised by commentators and opposition parties 
as unfair and antiquated because it does not reflect the true strength of contestants for 
power on the ground.
The results of the 1994 Botswana's parliamentary elections have necessitated the need to 
re-examine the suitability of the first past the post electoral system in contemporary 
Botswana. We need to examine whether other electoral systems can serve the country better 
in terms of enhancing the participation of the voters and accountability of people's 
representatives.
Nine (9) political parties contested the 1994 elections.20 The results of the elections showed 
that the two major political parties in Botswana, the Botswana Democratic Party and 
Botswana National Front, ranked very close to each other in terms of popular vote, but 
when votes were translated into seats the strength of the two main parties was seriously 
distorted. The ruling Botswana Democratic Party polled 151 Oil votes nationally. The main 
opposition Botswana National Front polled 102 362. The Botswana People's Party, the third
largest party in the country, polled 11 496. The aforementioned votes were translated into 
seats as follows:
Table 1: Results of the 1994 Botswana Parliamentary Elections
Political Parties Votes Polled
% Of Total 
Votes Polled Seats Gained
1. BDP 151 011 55 26
2. BNF 102 362 37 13
3. BPP 11 496 4 —
4. IFP 7 806 3 —
5. BPU 3 016 1 —
6. UDF 783 — —
T  USP 265 — —
8, LLB 235 — —
9. BLP 23 — —
Total 276 997 100 39
A comparison of the percentage polled by the individual parties from the 1979 to the 1994 
election shows progressive decline for the BDP, a steady increase for the BNF and a constant 
performance by smaller opposition parties, such as the BPP and BIP (EFP).
In 1979 when there were 32 seats in Parliament, the national poll w ls 58.4% out of which 
the BDP gained 29 seats and registered 75.2%, the BNF 2 seats and 13%, BPP 1 seat and 
7.4%, and, BIP 0 seats and 4.2%. In 1984 there were 34 seats in Parliament, the national poll 
was 77.6% out of which the BDP gained 29 seats and 68%, BNF 4 seats and 20.4%, BPP I 
seat and 6.6%, and, BIP 0 seats and 3.2%. In 1989 there were again 34 seats in Parliament,
20. Election Report (note 2), p. 9.
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the national poll was 68,23%, out of which the BDP gained 31 seats and 64,78%, BNF 3 
seats and 26,95%, BPP 0 seats and 4,34%, and, the BIP 0 seats and 2.4%. During the recent 
1994 elections there were 40 seats in Parliament and the national poll was 76,60%, out of 
which the BDP gained 27 seats and 54,43%, BNF 13 seats and 36,07%, the BPP 0 seats 
4,18%, whilst the IFP gained 0 seats and registered 2,76% (Thamaga Constituency excluded).
The number of seats gained by individual parties though decisive for the purpose of victory, 
is not indicative of the strength the parties command nationally. The percentages polled 
nationally, are a better indication of the strength and popularity each party has at a national 
level. As earlier indicated, the BDP strength and popularity have declined whilst those of 
the BNF have increased during the past four general elections between 1979 and 1994. 
Whilst the number of BDP seats between 1979 and 1989 appear constant at 29, 29, 31, the 
strength and popularity of the party have been decreasing. Thus 75,2%; 68% and 64,78%. It 
is only in 1994 that the BDP seems to have experienced a rude awakening at 27 seats, and 
54,43%, excluding the Tharnaga Constituency, where there was a by-election later.
Table 2: Election Results 1979-1994
Year
% o f
voters
% vote 
polled BNF BPP
BIP / 
IFP
BDP
seats
won BNF BPP
BIP/
IFP
No. Of 
seats to 
be won
Majority
in
seats
1979 5 8 .4 7 5 .2 13 7.4 3.2 29 2 1 0 32 29
1984 7 6 .6 68 20 .4 6 .6 3.2 29 4 1 0 32 29
1989 6 8 .2 3 6 4 .7 8 26 .9 5 4 .3 4 2.4 31 3 0 0 34 31
1994 7 6 .6 0 54 .4 3 3 6 .0 7 4 .1 8 2 .7 6 27 13 0 0 40 27
The winner takes all system is inherently unfair as can be gleaned from the 1994 elections, 
in terms of which the BNF, the main opposition party polled 36% of the total votes cast and 
won 13 seats in a 40 seats parliament. If the proportional representation system was used 
the BNF could have secured 17 seats which would have been a fair proportion of the votes cast.
One clear feature of Botswana's politics is that the opposition parties are strong in urban 
areas and the ruling party in the rural areas. Botswana's demographic pattern shows that 
the rate of rural urban migration is high and continues to rise as people continue to search 
for non-existent jobs in towns and cities. This demographic pattern may lead to anomalous 
results where a government may be elected by a minority of voters but is able to obtain a 
majority in terms of seats if the present electoral system is followed.
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: AN OVERVIEW
A wide variety of electoral systems exists in the world. For purposes of this article electoral 
systems are classified into three groups. These are the plurality; mixed proportional systems 
and proportional representation systems, hereinafter referred as PR. In the debate on election 
methods, two arguments predominate. The proponents of the plurality system argue that 
its great advantage is that it produces firm government or in any case, that it is much more 
likely to do so than PR. Their line of reasoning is that the plurality method, by discriminating
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against small parties, encourages a two party system, which in turn makes stable one party 
government possible.21
The main argument of the advocates of proportional representation is that a democratic 
legislature should be representative of all interests and viewpoints of the electorates.
There is an abundance of literature that shows that the protagonists of the two system 
broadly agree that proportional representation methods substantially lead to fair 
distribution of seats relative to the votes cast and that the plurality system leads to relatively 
more stable governments. The proportional representation protagonists argue that a strong 
stable government founded on disproportionate representation is undemocratic and does 
not inspire confidence among the voters and may suffer from a legitimacy crisis. There are 
those who argue that proportional representation may be fair but that does not mean it is 
democratic.22
Some people are prepared to retain the simple plurality system because they attach great 
importance to stability of governments. It is said the plurality system promotes a member 
of parliament's contact with his geographical constituency and further that the method of 
voting is simple. PR supporters point out that PR promotes representation of minorities 
such as ethnic and cultural communities. In fact in an era where women's lack of 
representation in political structures is a major concern, PR may offer the solution to 
equitable representation of women.23
The bottom line however, is that these electoral systems both have advantages and 
disadvantages. The choice of which electoral system to follow is a political one, often dictated 
by the interests of the dominant political force which is in government or hopes to be in 
government. Consequently, the choice of an electoral system can be quite opportunistic.24
It has also been argued that like all political instruments, electoral systems inevitably have 
a class bias and that in some situations, depending on the development of social formation, 
the class dimension may be subordinated to other factors like ethnicity or tribalism.25
Since elections are an aspect of democracy the choice of an electoral system may reflect the 
dominant political force conception of democracy and further, since democracy is a 
contested concept an electoral system is not and cannot be static, because whether or not it 
changes depends on the struggle that is waged on the ground by contestants for power. 
Those who formulate an electoral system hope that the system of their choice will keep in 
power forces who share their political and value perspective.26
Plurality Systems
In terms of this system voting is based on a single constituency and the candidate who 
obtains the largest number of votes is declared the winner, notwithstanding that the winner
21. Grofinan et al Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequence (1986), pp. 124-38.
22. Peter Haine, Proportional (Bias) Representation: The Case against PR in Britain (1986) Chapters 1-2.
23. Legal Forum Vol. 6. No. 3, September 1994 Legal Resources Foundation, Zimbabwe.
24. Kader Asmal et al (note 8), pp. 1-23.
25. M. Ncube and Collins Parker, Comparative Electoral Systems and Political Consequences: Options for 
Namibia (United Nations Institute for Namibia) (1988), pp. 1-10.
26. Ibid.
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may actually have been elected by 25% of the voters — as long as he has been elected by a 
larger percentage of voters.
In Britain where the system originated it was understood then that members of parliament 
represented geographical entities with discernible boundaries. MPs represented not 
opinions or ideological tendencies nor political parties but constituencies.27
The plurality system is the oldest electoral system in the world and still commands 
considerable support. The emergence of the party-system led to the questioning of the 
efficacy of the system, especially because the system was originally predicated on the theory 
of territorial representation before the proliferation of political parties. With the proliferation 
of political parties and their occupation of the centre stage in electoral processes, the theory 
of territorial representation was questioned as failing to meet the imperatives of democratic 
representation. In the context of Britain those who are unhappy with the system have said 
the following about the first past the post electoral system.
First past the post electoral system can unquestionably result in all sorts of anomalies.
Labour lost power in 1951 despite having 1% less votes than the Tories. . .  Mrs Thatcher 
gained a landslide victory in 1983 by winning 58 more seats than in the 1979 general 
election even though the Tory vote actually declined by 1.57c.28
Discontent with first past the post electoral system, especially relating to the ability of the 
system to produce a government with an overall majority on the basis of a minority of the 
popular vote has led to some adaptations to ensure that a member of parliament is elected 
by the majority of the voters, hence majoritarian systems. Majoritarian systems have two 
major variants: absolute majority or alternative or preferential vote.
Absolute majority voting requires a candidate to obtain one more vote of half the votes 
cast. If no candidate is elected by the majority a second ballot is held. In this system a 
simple majority is sufficient in the second round of voting.
With respect to the preferential system voters vote for a single candidate but indicate in a 
declining order their preferences for others. If none of the candidates receives absolute 
majority in the first count, the least popular candidate is eliminated and his second 
preference redistributed. The operation is repeated until one candidate obtains absolute 
majority.
Proportional Representation
Proportional representation has two major variations; List PR and the single transferable 
vote. This tends to make it extremely complex. It is perhaps owing to its complexity that it 
probably boasts of the largest number of books and articles dedicated to its analysis.29 It 
was first tried in Belgium in 1885 and today a considerable number of countries 
practise it.
27. Kader Asmal (note 8), pp. 1-23.
28. Peter Haine (note 22), 1.
29. Electoral Systems: A Worldwide Comparative Study, Inter Parliamentary Union (1994).
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The main aim of proportional representation is proportionality: The allocation of seats 
must be proportional to the votes cast. This system is said to be fair because minority 
parties are included in governance.30
Proportionality therefore is the major virtue of the system; this ensures that no political 
force or part of public opinion enjoys monopoly of governance.
Those who are opposed to it charge that while PR may be fairer it is actually less democratic 
because it involves the creation of monster constituencies where Members of Parliament 
have no link with the voters. It is also criticised for centralising power in party bureaucracies, 
thereby diminishing the power of individual voters. It also has a tendency to lead to the 
fragmentation of political forces which may lead to instability.31
There are basically two basic models of proportional representation: Full proportional 
representation and limited proportional representation. Full proportional representation 
is involved where the country as a whole is one constituency, as in Israel, Namibia and 
Holland.32 In limited proportional representation elections are carried out in various 
constituencies and distribution of seats takes place at this level.
Semi-Proportional System or Mixed Systems
Some electoral systems have the characteristics of both the plurality system and proportional 
representation system and are often called mixed systems.33 This system is used in multi­
member constituencies. It is often classified as semi-proportional. The voter may only choose 
a single candidate. The system permits minority representation and this is what 
distinguishes it from the plurality system.34
ELECTORAL REFORMS
As a result of the concerns discussed earlier, the constitution was amended in the course of 
1997 to establish an independent management body, reduce voting age from 21 years to 18 
and to introduce an absentee ballot system.
Prior to the 1997 Constitutional Amendment Act, the conduct and supervision of the 
elections was the responsibility of the supervisor of elections. The supervisor of elections 
was obliged by law " . . .  to enforce on the part of all election officers, fairness, impartiality 
and compliance with the provisions of the Act" 35
, The office of the supervisor of elections was staffed by 15 permanent members. Its staff 
was technically part of the civil service. Recruitment of staff was done by the Directorate of 
Public Service Management.36 The office of supervisor of elections relied heavily on District
30. Kader Asmal (note 8), pp. 1-23.
31. Electoral Systems: A Worldwide Comparative Study (note 29), p. 8.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. S 3, Electoral Act: Cap 02:07.
36. Ayeni V. and Somblekae, G. "Promoting the Credibility and Effectiveness of Electoral Administration 
Agencies: The Case of Botswana", paper presented at a seminar on The Strengthening of Electoral 
Administration in Africa, Ghana, April 1993, p. 14.
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Commissioners who were used as returning or presiding officers during elections. This 
heavy reliance on the civil service tended to blur the distinction between his office and 
government departments. The supervisor of elections was to be independent and not 
"subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority".37 To further enhance 
the independence of the supervisor of elections, his tenure of office was secured, like those 
of judges. He could only be removed from office for inability to perform the functions of 
his office or for misbehaviour.
Whilst the provisions of the constitution and the Electoral Act sought to entrench the 
independence and impartiality of the office, one single provision, which gave the president 
the sole power to appoint the supervisor of elections, was a source of serious discontent. 
The opposition parties alleged that the supervisor of elections was a member of the ruling 
party and therefore biased against the opposition. The net result was an opposition highly 
skeptical of the fairness of the office. In the end, the credibility of the office of supervisor of 
elections was highly suspect.
A national referendum was held to determine whether Batswana agree to the proposal to 
amend the Constitution to provide for the appointment of an independent electoral 
commission to conduct and supervise both parliamentary and local authority elections 
instead of the supervisor of elections. The people voted in favour of the independent 
electoral commission.38 39
Composition and Appointment of the independent Electoral Commission
The Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1997 makes provision for the appointment of the 
independent electoral commission to "supervise the conduct of elections".31* The 
independent electoral commission is appointed by the judicial service commission and 
has a secretary appointed by the president alone. According to the Act, the commission 
shall consist of a High Court Judge as chairman, and five other members, and a legal 
practitioner. The five other members shall be appointed by the judicial service commission 
from a list of persons recommended by the all-party conference.
The Constitution provides that the chairman and the rest of the members of the commission 
shall hold office for the period of two successive lives of parliament. A person shall not be 
qualified to be a member of the independent electoral commission if he /she has been 
declared insolvent or bankrupt; or has been convicted of an offence involving dishonesty.
Functions of the Commission
The functions of the commission are the following: (i) the conduct and supervision of 
elections of the elected members of the national assembly and members of the local 
authority; and conduct of a referendum;40 (ii) give instructions and directions to the secretary
37. S 66 (7) of the Constitution of Botswana.
38. Report to the Honourable Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration on the conduct 
of the 1997 Hationgi Referendum, p. 18.
39. Constitution Amendment Act, 1997.
40. S 2 (12), note 39.
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of the commission;41 (iii) ensuring that elections are conducted efficiently, properly, freely 
and fairly;42 and (iv) performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act oi 
parliament.43
The commission is required on completion of any election conducted by it to submit a 
report on the exercise of its functions to the minister for the time being in charge of the 
elections. The substantive functions in regard to the running of the elections are the 
responsibility of the secretary to the commission. The secretary's functions, "are to exercise 
general supervision over the registration of voters for elections of the elected members of 
the national assembly, and the members of any local authority" ,44
A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as secretary to the independent electoral 
commission if (i) he is not a citizen of Botswana; (ii) he has been declared insolvent or 
bankrupt: (iii) he has been convicted of any offence involving dishonesty in any country.
The constitution stipulates that members of the commission shall hold office for a period 
of two successive lives of parliament. It does not set out grounds upon which membership 
of the comimission may be terminated such as expulsion or resignation.
The circumstances under which the secretary of the commission may vacate office are 
however, set out quite clearly in the Act. A person holding the office of the secretary shall 
vacate office on attaining the age of 65 years or such other age as may be prescribed by an 
Act of parliament. A holder of the office of the secretary may be removed from office for 
inability to perform the functions of his office (whether arising from the infirmity of body 
or mind or from any other cause) or for misbehaviour.
The secretary can only be removed in accordance with the procedure set out in the 
Constitution, which requires that wherever the president considers that there is reason to 
remove the secretary, he shall appoint a tribunal which shall consist of a chairman and not 
less that two members who hold or have held high judicial office. The tribunal shall inquire 
into and report on its findings to the president and advise the president on whether the 
secretary ought to be removed. Once the president has been advised to remove the secretary 
by the tribunal, he has no discretion but to remove him because the empowering provision 
is peremptory and uses the word shall. The president is also empowered to suspend the 
secretary from office pending the submission of the report by the tribunal.
The issue of removing the secretary is problematic in that whilst it is desirable to remove 
the secretary or even other members of the commission, who are abusing their office, by 
promoting the interests of the other party, care must be taken not to take any measures that 
may be construed as improper or meant to compromise the independence of the secretary 
or any other member.
The other difficulty with respect to the grounds of removal of the secretary is that what 
amounts to 'misbehaviour' and even 'incapacity' may be controversial. It is suggested that 
removal on the basis of misconduct must be a decision of a five member panel of serving
41. S 2 (12) (b), note 39.
42. S 2 (12) (c), note 39.
43. S 2 (12) (d), note 39.
44. S 3, note 39.
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judges. A decision that calls for the removal of the secretary or any other member on the 
basis of 'misbehaviour' must be carried by a two-thirds majority of the panel.
With respect to incapacity, it is suggested that the constitution should clearly provide that 
the secretary or any other member may be removed on the grounds of incapacity, if it is 
certified by one or more duly qualified medical practitioners that he/she is substantially 
incapacitated or incapable by reason of any infirmity of mind or body of carrying out the 
functions of the secretary or commissioner. As a matter of fair procedure, it is further 
suggested that the secretary or commissioner who is removed on the ground of incapacity 
should be given the opportunity to make representations in writing that he /she may wish 
to make in response to the proposal to remove him or her.
The powers of the commission are cast in broad terms to include supervision. It will be 
helpfu l to specify  the pow ers, duties and functions of the com m ission more 
comprehensively. The Act must specify clearly the commission's responsibilities in relation 
to administration, organisation, conduct and supervision of elections.
CONCLUSION
It is self-evident from the synopsis that some aspects of Botswana's electoral process need 
fine tuning. In particular the country's first past the post electoral system appears to yield 
very undemocratic results which distorts popular support of other political parties. The 
recent electoral reforms, in particular the establishment of the independent electoral 
commission, the reduction of voting age from 21 years to 18 and the introduction of the 
absentee ballot system, will go a long way in enhancing the fairness of the electoral process 
in Botswana.
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